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Abstract
A lingering question in criticism of Wieland asks why the narrator, Clara, uncharacteristi-
cally withholds knowledge of events and perpetrators—a decision making for exciting reading but
showing a baffling artifice. Why does this traumatized protagonist spend so much time impart-
ing her past ignorance when the eventualities are known to her at the time of her writing? Some
suggest that Clara withholds the facts in an attempt to impart a feeling to readers, enlisting their
sympathy and casting Carwin as the villain. Others read Clara’s narrative strategies as a product of
mental instability, perhaps even insanity. But there exists another possibility: I suggest that Clara’s
narrative logic is part of a larger theory of causality, accepted with complete faith by Clara and her
companions, and characterized most often by a conceptualization of “flow” in the text.
This term flow, and related ones like “chain” and “train”, are used with almost neurotic con-
stancy to describe the connections between precedents and antecedents, defining the actions of the
present in terms of past inertia and predicting the future with prophetic surety. Likewise, these
terms feature heavily in the long, pregnant passages regarding the drift of consciousness in the
interior life of the narrator. Clara’s retention of the eventual facts need not be read as an artifi-
cial device of story-telling, nor a manipulative tool in the prosecution of Carwin, but instead as
emblematic of the novel’s interrogation—and ultimate critique—of Enlightenment faith in perfect
continuity, a faith which would justify Clara’s dogged commitment to revealing events only in
their original sequence. Ultimately, I argue that Brown’s novel gestures toward the possibility of a
more open Gothic model of events and thoughts, which could address the problematic ambiguities
that remain despite Clara’s attempt to impose a rigidly causal and chronological narrative.
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Misleading Causality 
In the last years of the eighteenth century, Charles Brockden-Brown wrote the first 
major American Gothic novel, reworking a famous criminal case of arson and mur-
der into a dizzying narrative of mystery, religious fanaticism, and the inexplicable. 
Beyond these interests in uncertainty, much of the novel's notorious difficulty stems 
from its fractured narrative, rendering it more a series of set-pieces than a cohesive 
story. The first set-piece is Wieland Sr.'s solitary temple, built on a hill of the proper-
ty to which he retreated from religious persecution in Europe, which subsequently 
recalls the formative imagery of Winthrop's “shining city on a hill”. Yet while there 
is indeed an inexplicable luminescence in Wieland's temple, it is not that of radiant 
peace but, in fact, the flicker which preempts a mysterious conflagration, a sponta-
neous combustion which kills the elder Wieland. This unexplained event, and the 
temple of lonely meditation which houses it, models some of the complex interac-
tions between belief, uncertainty, and violence in the text, even as the optimistic ide-
ologies of American destiny and Enlightenment progress are called into question. 
The novel's Gothic qualities question such totalizing structures as Brown re-
worked the Gothic form to fit the US landscape and the conflicts inherent to its ex-
pansionist and Enlightenment projects. Lacking the castles and cathedrals of Europe 
and the political or religious controversies which haunt them, Brown defends his 
alterations, dismissing the “[p]uerile superstition and exploded manners, Gothic cas-
tles and chimeras,” of European practitioners and instead invokes “incidents of Indi-
an hostility, and the perils of the Western wilderness, [as] far more suitable” subjects 
for Americans (Brown, Edgar Huntly 3). But despite dismissing chimeras and super-
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stitions, which suggests a skeptic's disenchantment of the Gothic world, Brown's 
oeuvre manifests a striking, critical approach toward the comfortable rationalist sub-
ject. Indeed, supernatural forces and even madness hover at the fringes of civiliza-
tion and the civilized. Far from evacuating the Gothic of the power of irrational and 
supernatural forces, Wieland describes the susceptibility of figures of comfortable 
surety and provokes an acceptance of uncertainty, and the possibility of an accompa-
nying faith, as necessary qualities of openness to non-material values and to others. 
But the primary way in which Brown's Gothic poses an uncertain alternative to total-
izing and concreted structures of certainty comes in the manner of the story's telling, 
the text's meticulously reconstructed narration by Clara, which clashes with the the-
matic interest in Gothic ambiguities.  
Wieland Sr.'s death left his two children, Clara and her brother, the younger Wie-
land, each half the property, including that lonely temple which they convert into an 
outdoor parlor for company and lively talk. But their group's educated society is 
marred by inexplicable voices, which confuse and concern them as the voices seem 
to come from impossible distances or absent speakers. Not long after, their group is 
introduced to a mysterious wanderer, Carwin, whom Clara finds fascinating. The 
mysterious voices begin to threaten Clara, who twice hears them conspiring behind 
her closet door, and worse they work upon Wieland Jr., who follows in his father's 
obsessiveness, albeit one transformed by Enlightenment philosophies. Under what 
he believes to be God's direction, Wieland kills his family and unsuccessfully attacks 
his sister, only to be drawn off by the vocalizations of Carwin, who has just told 
Clara that he is a talented ventriloquist. The novel ends with Wieland being arrested 
and Carwin admitting to teasing the group with his powers, even using them to move 
surreptitiously among them, but adamantly denying having given Wieland order or 
cause to resort to murderous acts. The possibility of Wieland's madness and/or su-
pernatural agency lingers in the text, disputed by the rationalistic family friend, 
Pleyel, who marries Clara at the novel's close.  
For this exploration of certainty, faith, and the supernatural, it is not just important 
that the novel ends in uncertainty, but also that the attempt to explain away what 
appears inexplicable is itself actually linked with the most violent and problematic 
moments in the text. When Clara first rushes to Pleyel after hearing the conspiring 
voices which are later discovered to be Carwin terrorizing her, Pleyel refuses to be-
lieve her on the grounds of the unlikelihood of such voices. He argues that because 
they are inexplicable they are thus unwarrantable. Later in the book, he again refuses 
to believe Clara, this time as she protests her innocence of having been with Carwin. 
Pleyel heard Carwin's ventriloquism imitating Clara's voice, and therefore refuses to 
question the validity of his, even for the sake of his beloved's protestations. Even 
more telling of the pitfalls of such certainty is Wieland's justification of the murder 
of his family, in which he cites his desire for surety, for true knowledge of God's will 
as the monomania which would end in his murderous rampage. “I have thirsted for 
the knowledge of his will,” Wieland laments, “but my knowledge has always 
stopped short of certainty” (151). It is because of his rapture in “the supreme delight 
of knowing,” in the perceived command of God, called a “direct communication,” 
an “audible enunciation,” that Wieland feels capable and compelled to commit his 
24 IJCS 
atrocities. It is precisely Wieland's attempt to know divine will with certainty, be-
yond any measure of self-doubt, which provides the conditions for his being able to 
do that which self-doubt would certainly forestall. The novel, in this manner, links 
the impulse for certainty, the desire to erase or dismiss uncertainty, with the very acts 
of horror described. It is with this in mind, that I propose reading the text's narrato-
logical apparatus as coinciding with and illuminating a larger critique of the impulse 
to certainty and totalizing understanding.  
As a means of access to this topic, this paper begins by asking why the narrator, 
Clara, for so long withholds her knowledge of eventualities in the text's telling—a 
decision which makes for exciting reading but shows a baffling artifice on her part. 
Clara narrates the events after the fact but spends much time imparting her past igno-
rance when the future events are known to her. Some have suggested that Clara 
withholds the facts of the story in an attempt to impart a feeling toward the story, 
enlisting the reader's sympathy and casting Carwin as the villain. “Clara repeatedly 
asseverates Carwin’s responsibility for the destruction of her family,” Marcia Nich-
ols writes, “but instead of enlightening the reader, she chooses gradually to reveal the 
unsavory elements of Carwin’s character… prepares the reader to accept Carwin’s 
guilt without having adequately proved it” (463). Alternatively, and according to 
Anthony Galuzzo, “Clara does not present us with an exact summary of the story 
about to unfold so much as she evokes terror by way of deliberate obscurity” (262). 
Still others read Clara's narrative strategies as a product of her own mental instabil-
ity, perhaps even insanity (Russo 60). Instead of these arguments, I suggest Clara's 
narrative logic is part of a larger structure of understanding which the novel illumi-
nates and, ultimately, critiques—that is, an Enlightenment faith in causal chains, 
reciprocal effect, and an untainted translation of motive to destiny. Clara believes 
that events follow logically, from rational choices, and predictably toward their inev-
itable conclusions. I further suggest that the generic protocols of the Gothic, such as 
ineffable motivations and inexplicable consequences, coincide with a sense of radi-
cal openness to possibility as an alternative posture towards the world and to others, 
which contrasts with this strict Enlightenment causality. As Galluzzo indicates, and 
despite Clara's attempt to perfectly replicate the events as they corresponding to her 
discoveries, “Wieland famously leaves the reasons for the eponymous character’s 
horrific murders ambiguous, along with the “spontaneous combustion” that initiates 
Clara’s tale … These incongruous mixtures of style and genre attest to a more com-
plex process of literary appropriation on Brown’s part” (262-263). It is my conten-
tion that these “incongruous” stylistic elements of the novel arise from an active 
attempt of the narrator to impose a clear, logical, and chronological template over 
events which resist such determinations.  
A crucial attribute of my argument is that Brown's novel performs and encourages 
an uncertain Gothic sensibility, an openness to the inexplicable and an acceptance of 
the unknowable, more than any particular viewpoint voiced in the novel's transcribed 
debates. Jane Tomkins has focused on the historical controversies raging in post-
revolutionary America, and accounts for Wieland's strange mixture of elements as a 
clear indictment of certain Post-Revolutionary politics, particularly the dangers of 
social mobility and erasures of class markings. Tomkins likens the novel to “a politi-
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cal tract” which depicts an “uncharacteristically negative view of what it meant to 
survive the War of Independence,” (44) specifically citing the wandering Carwin as 
preying on a culture “in which the insignia of social stratification have been stripped 
away in the name of equality” (52). Tomkins notes Brown's defense of fictionality as 
a means of public edification, in a letter accompanying a copy of the book sent to 
Thomas Jefferson, and Brown's “notions of how writing fiction might change na-
tional opinion” (46). Unsurprisingly, Tomkins sees Brown's comments on the text's 
“usefulness” as stemming from a specific stance and contribution to the ongoing 
debates of Post-Revolutionary America, suggesting that Wieland's “meaning would 
be clear to his readers, since the usefulness of his book would naturally depend on its 
being understood” (41). But rather than trying to untangle the baffling events of the 
novel with the assumption that they contribute to a cohesive and specific political 
position, I suggest that the novel's dizzying affect and the fictionality which Brown 
employs is useful as a means of conditioning readers into a position of uncertainty, 
and a self-reflective, even humble, questioning of Enlightenment modes of account-
ing the world. The Gothic fictionality, in this manner, is not important as a more ef-
fective means of building toward a rationalistic position but rather a method of ex-
panding questions outside of causal certainty. 
The quality of rationalism critiqued here is primarily sketched out in Clara and 
her companions, indeed even serves as a topic of discussion, and is characterized 
most often by the concept of “flow” in the text. The term flow, and related ones like 
“chain,” “train,” and “series”, are used with almost neurotic constancy to describe 
the connections between precedents and antecedents, defining the actions of the pre-
sent in terms of past inertia and predicting the future with prophetic surety. Likewise, 
these terms feature heavily in the long, pregnant passages regarding the drift of con-
sciousness in the interior life of the narrator. Clara's narratalogical retention of the 
facts is emblematic of a commitment to an Enlightenment sense of perfect continui-
ty, which would justify Clara's dogged attempts to reveal events only in their original 
sequence. While it is ostensibly the vocalizations of Carwin that “mislead” the char-
acters of Wieland, it is Clara's attempts at organizing events that produce the mis-
leadingly certain account of the story. Ultimately, Brown's novel gestures toward the 
need for a more unstable model of narrative which could accommodate the problem-
atic ambiguities that remain despite the imposition of a rigidly causal and chronolog-
ical narrative.  
In a relevant study of paranoia and conspiracy theories in this post-revolutionary 
period, Gordon Wood has shown that it was common among “'reasonable people,' 
indeed the most enlightened minds of the day-to believe in malevolent conspiracies” 
(409). Wood clarifies that the “belief in plots was not a symptom of disturbed minds 
but a rational attempt to explain human phenomena in terms of human intentions and 
to maintain moral coherence in the affairs of men” (429). Ultimately, the belief 
“flowed from the scientific promise of the Enlightenment” but also, “represented an 
effort, perhaps in retrospect a last desperate effort, to hold men personally and moral-
ly responsible for their actions” (411). It is this sensibility at work in Clara's plotting 
of the events which is critiqued via Brown's Gothic uncertainties. Wood's historical 
study even finds nonfictional writing of Brown's, from the year following Wieland's 
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publication, which reveal Brown's specific resistance to this paranoid impulse which 
attributes tragedy to causal chains of human intention. The problem being that such 
thinkers “'assume that all the disastrous consequences were produced by certain in-
dividuals and were "foreseen and intended.' To avoid such simple-minded conspira-
torial beliefs, wrote Brown, we must be 'conscious of the uncertainty of history' and 
recognize that 'actions and motives cannot be truly described,' for they are not al-
ways integrally related” (436-437). This uncertainty and indescribability is evident in 
the Gothic ambiguity in Wieland which clashes so startlingly against the attempted 
reconstruction by Clara. 
Clara's invasive structuring of events also coincides with theories of narrative and 
the way stories reflect back on their telling, proving to be metaphors of their own 
interest in articulation. Peter Brooks suggests that in story-telling, “the incomprehen-
sible metaphor of transmission” must be “unpacked as metonymy” (26). That is, 
story-telling as a means of exploring the relation between the telling and the ex-
pressed, cannot have recourse to a simple metaphoric correspondence but must be 
revealed in the small, step-wise, metonymic movement of plot. This characterization 
seems to fit Clara's methodical commitment to chronology, insisting that we can 
only understand the “meaning” of what happened to her by following her through 
each step. The sequencing of story, its plotting out, Brooks claims, more than its 
central themes and symbols, provide access to a story's most salient interest: the final 
closure of meaning, which an ending bestows. Brooks asserts that, “it is important to 
pursue the notion of desire as that which is initiatory of narrative, motives and ener-
gizes its reading, and animates the combinatory play of sense-making” (48). I quote 
Brooks at length to suggest how Clara's desire in plotting, expressed in a carefully 
recreated simulation of her own gradual understandings, is not to unpack or interpret 
what happened but precisely to impose a “sense-making” on the narrative. Clara, as 
opposed to Carwin whom I will touch on later, is not a reader of the events but a 
writer, not interpreting but fitting them into a pre-formed rhetorical mould. This rhe-
torical sense-making, which will also be considered in its own right, comes highly 
suspicious in a text so riddled with irrationality and an implicit critique of the desire 
for pure-truth. Brown's violently disruptive Gothic undermines the rigid plotting, 
confuses even the most carefully constructed chronologies, and likewise insists on 
the need for uncertainty in the end, a doubt of oneself and the self's capacity for total-
izing knowledge. But the text insists, nonetheless, on the need for keeping faith in 
each other and in the capacity of narrative to render meaning despite the limits of its 
construction—so that even as faith turned to certainty is shown to be murderous, 
faith based in uncertainty holds the possibility of keeping a vigil for meaning without 
the danger of imposing mastery. 
Unerring Flow 
The novel's opening features the purposeful aim of its narrator with Clara's claim 
that her story will “exemplify the force of early impressions, and show the immeas-
urable evils that flow from an erroneous or imperfect discipline” (5). This is the first 
example of a “flow” in the novel, and in the first paragraph no less. And indeed we 
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get a sense of Clara's own early impressions and her reasons for believing in their 
primacy in a description of her father. His religious belief looked to originary 
sources, even built on the liquid metaphor of “flow”, by calling the Bible the “foun-
tain, beyond which it was unnecessary to trace the stream of religious truth” (8). And 
just as the father imagines his divine calling of missionary work as flowing unerring-
ly from this source, so does he eventually imagine his death as an unavoidable end 
after his perceived failures as a religious emissary to the Native Americans (12). 
Though the father's individualized faith might be seen as an encouraging resistance 
toward totalizing religious expressions, the impulse toward proselytization suggests 
that his expression too was totalizing in its own fashion.    
After the father's spectacular death and the religious fanaticism which character-
ized his life, his children appear to choose a different ideological posture toward the 
world. The father's temple of lonely meditation has been made into a “joyous” (22) 
space of society and of intellectual and rhetorical praxis, complete with a bust of the 
master rhetorician, Cicero, at its center (22). But the inescapable teleologies of the 
father's belief linger in his temple, and his children recreate his sense of the primacy 
of originary sources and fated destinies in their own world of reason, rhetoric, and 
Enlightenment surety. The first debate we are privy to among this enlightened four-
some hinges upon this very concern. Pleyel declaims Wieland's argument, citing a 
wrong Latin translation as the source from which Wieland moves and thus invalidat-
ing all of his following claims (28). And of course,“[n]othing,” says Clara, “would 
decide the contest, but an appeal to the volume” (28), further illustrating the group's 
understanding of veracity as modeled by the idea of truth necessarily flowing from 
an originating source.  
Among this group, Wieland is described as governed by “moral necessity and 
Calvinistic inspiration” and it is not surprising that he too saw his “father's death [… 
as] flowing from a direct and supernatural decree” (33, my emphasis). Later in the 
novel, after Wieland has murdered his family in accordance with what he believes is 
a divine mandate, we hear his court arguments in his own defense. Wieland recreates 
the flow of his thoughts for the court, insisting that “the series of my thoughts are 
easily traced” (152); and like his father before him, he sees God's mandate as the 
worthy “source” (152-3) from which his inspiration comes. Citing the worthiness of 
his source in his father's God, and the natural, easily followed flow of his thoughts, 
Wieland believes his final actions—nothing less than the murder of his family—to 
be beyond reproach. 
This sensibility, though not the murderous end, is echoed in Clara's writing as she 
too attempts to piece out the flowing movement of her thoughts and the story itself, 
as a means of justifying her vision of understanding. And just as her brother and 
father insist that God is the fount from which good flows, so does Clara admit that 
incalculable “evils may flow from the consequent deductions and understanding” 
(33, my emphasis) of depraved senses. What is more, we see this conceptualization 
of “flow” in Clara's thoughts, as she self-consciously ponders over her musings, 
wonders at how they give way to each other, a veritable steam-of-consciousness. “So 
flexible, and yet stubborn, is the human mind” she remarks, only to describe its func-
tion as “unalterably observant of the direction given to it” and to lament that begin-
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ning on the first “link” leads one inevitably down to a “termination of that chain” 
(50). But Clara's confidence in perfect continuity and her belief that events will inev-
itably yield to their fatal result, called the “paranoid style” by Wood, seems to be 
highly problematic as it also includes, like her father, a sense that actions follow in-
tentions and thus eventualities can always be traced to early mistakes. In a now fa-
mous line Clara admits that she “used to suppose that certain evils could never befall 
a being in possession of a sound mind” (61). This sort of logic follows from what we 
observe in the enlightened foursome and serves to set “a sound mind” as the greatest 
protection a person can secure. 
In a significant moment, discovering that the voices in her closet were Carwin 
tormenting her, Clara's impulse is to resist the chaotic nature of her mind. “Order” 
she laments, “could not readily be introduced into my thoughts” (85) until she con-
centrates to “give a slower motion” and to “regulate the confusion” (86). Clara's faith 
in things flowing from their source toward their inevitable end give her the sense that 
“ordering” her thoughts, “regulating” them, will yield purity of understanding. This 
concept is a through-line in the major characters of the book, and seems to be Clara's 
justification for retaining the facts of her story until their occurrence in the chrono-
logical order she so assiduously maintains. Just as Clara must “order” her thoughts, 
“regulate” them to bring about an understanding of the events and their continuities, 
so does she order and regulate the flow of information to the reader, such that we 
understand events as she did, never knowing what is to come as she does in the mo-
ment of writing, but anchored always to her ignorance at the time of the story's oc-
currence. Brooks suggests plotting and narration of events in story are driven by a 
human psychological “need for ordering” (xi), that plots are “explanatory narrative” 
which seeks to establish origins and continuity with the past (6). And this seems to 
bear out in Clara's construction of the story out of these events. But we must recog-
nize the problematic implications of Clara's project—it is not just continuity with the 
past that plotting establishes but also a platform for the eventually concreted mean-
ing in the end.  
The praxis of establishing a basis of credibility from which to draw claims is an 
important topic in Wieland, particularly because Brown studied Law before becom-
ing the country's first novelist. And the story seems to register the difference between 
fictionality and rhetoric, at least implicitly, with rhetoric being the favored practice 
for the group's entertainment. Clara admits much respect for rhetoric, applauding 
Pleyel, whose “narratives were constructed with so much skill [… that things] least 
entitled to credit, were as yet rendered probable by the exquisite art of this rhetori-
cian” (68). Given this respect of rhetoric, and Clara's explicit claim at the outset that 
the story will “exemplify” her point, it is tempting to view Clara's narrative strategies 
as a rhetorical, rather than novel-esque endeavor. And indeed her own rhetorically 
motivated narrativising is confirmed at the novel's close, as she reveals a purposeful 
trajectory; “all that I have said is preparatory for this scene” she claims after the cli-
mactic scene where Carwin's ventriloquism calls off Wieland. And just afterward she 
gives the moral of her story, illustrated by a side plot: virtue becomes the victim of 
treachery, but only “owing their existence to the errors of the sufferers” (223). She 
suggests that should Wieland have begun with “juster notions of moral duty, and of 
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the divine attributes” or she been “gifted with ordinary equanimity of foresight, the 
double tongued deceiver would have been baffled and repelled” (224). Clara's narra-
tive logic insists that things flow predictably from their source and thus knowing the 
source or the destination, one may reconstruct and understand the sequence of 
events. Not only does she organize the narrative to move unerringly according to her 
rhetorical vision, her vision is itself about the importance of locating the source and 
destination of narrative. In essence, we might argue that Clara is not telling the story 
of her experience at all but rather trying to prove an argument about her experience 
via the careful plotting. 
But despite the concerted intentions of the narrator, the text moves subtly to un-
dermine this sort of concreted logic. Carwin serves to show that Clara's faith in cause 
and effect, motive and action, are fundamentally flawed. Steadfastly denying having 
called Wieland to murder, Carwin still apologizes for his cruel and manipulative 
ventriloquizing, saying, “I have acted but my actions have possibly affected more 
than I designed” (179). He goes on to admit that he acted “without malignant inten-
tions, but without caution” (181). Later he will wonder at the series of events, asking 
how his acts could “set in progress the machine” (197) of such horrors. While Car-
win vocalizes a resistance to the notion that consequences flow from a motivated 
source, Wieland's protestations of innocence also undermine the reasonableness of 
Clara's model by showing its logic taken ad absurdum. We are told in the beginning 
that an aim of his intellectual curiosity was “to settle the relation between motives 
and actions” (22) and in the end, after Carwin informs Wieland that he is not acting 
on divine orders, Wieland claims, “[i]f I erred, it was not my judgement that de-
ceived me but my senses. In thy sight, being of beings! I am still pure. Still will I 
look for my reward in thy justice” (205). Clara speaks our outrage at this twisted 
reasoning, shocked that he found “consolation in the rectitude of his motives” (205), 
even if she fails to realize her ideological complicity to this logic. Essentially, Car-
win and Wieland both deconstruct Clara's belief in motivations determining effects: 
Carwin by suggesting events far exceed his intentions, Wieland by suggesting that 
good intents justify all their repercussions.  
The novel ends with no resolution of its mysteries but does so, instead, with 
Clara's assertions of the story's moral, that all tragedies can be reasonably traced to 
mistakes, and with Clara's marriage to Pleyel. And like the imposed meaning, 
stamped over the problematic fissures, Clara's marriage also smacks of a forced rec-
onciliation. Pleyel, long described as the most skeptical with regard to the unknown 
in an already skeptical group (23), failed twice to believe Clara in her time of inno-
cence and need, choosing both times to side with his reasonings instead of crediting 
the implausible. And at the end, Pleyel maintains still that all of the events can be 
understood logically, despite the deep inconsistencies of the text. That Clara chooses 
to construct and understand the story according to the rhetorical praxis of the brother 
who justifies his murders, and the lover who fails to have faith in her own torment 
because of its supernatural overtones, seems to reiterate the importance of an alterna-
tive though it goes mostly unspoken in the tightly controlled text. While Clara's nar-
rative strategies and the Enlightenment ideologies which bolster them comprise the 
matrix of concreteness and fanatical surety in the text, the Gothic uncertainty seeping 
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through and a sense of faithful openness exist alternatively.  
This alternative, an alternative posture towards those things unaccountable, seems 
best modeled in Brown's Gothic. It provides a sense of dimness to vision, as the 
Gothic is want, and an air of uncertainty with regard to knowledge of the material or 
the divine. But more important perhaps, it begs an openness to both, a willingness to 
self-reflect, pause in uncertainty and accommodate one's self to imperfect 
knowledge even as we strive to understand. It could also stretch to cover the sort of 
faithful credit to persons which fails in the text, as in Clara's treatment of Carwin, 
and Pleyel's treatment of Clara. It is precisely the power of the Gothic, Brown's 
Gothic especially, which looks to condition its readers into a sense of this humble-
ness before the irreducible complexities of the world, the unaccountable vagaries of 
fate, and the dangers of a position of mastery over narrative and understanding.  
Uncertain Faith 
Before this final section, it is important to clarify the terms “Gothic” and “faith” in 
this study with regard to their historical contexts, insofar as it is possible and to the 
purpose of the inquiries here. The term “Gothic” is most relevantly defined as aes-
thetically “belonging to the dark ages” as “opposed to the classical” (OED). As such, 
its narrative associations are often the mystical, excessive, and romantic instead of 
the staid and systematic. The Gothic genre has long been characterized by its own 
internal frictions, evidenced by the difference in its eighteenth century originator, 
Horace Walpole, and its most popular producer, Anne Radcliffe. While Walpole's 
The Castle of Otronto (1764) languishes in fantasy and the supernatural, Radcliffe's 
novels helped develop the subgeneric strain of “the supernatural explained,” where 
all mysteries eventually prove to be materially accountable. Brown's work in literary 
magazines evinces his fluency with both sides of the genre, his vocal involvement in 
the debates of its artistic merit, and its possibly “dangerous system of morals,” 
though Brown's most pointed criticisms seem to fault the genre for derivativeness 
more than danger (Cody, 117). W.M. Verhoeven has noted in Brown a tension be-
tween the scientifically sound and the supernaturally explorative Gothic, apparent in 
diary writings where Brown brainstormed novel ideas:  
[I]n the diary he lists 'Miracles. Events produced by divine agen-
cy’, among which he mentions: ‘Conception’; ‘Contravertion of 
gravity’; ‘Revival’; ‘Turning water to wine’; ‘multiplying food’; 
‘Healing frenzy’; ‘Restoration of life’; ‘prescience’; and ‘omnis-
cience’. Although these manuscript jottings are well-known, I 
mention them anyway because they throw into relief the fact that 
Brown, a ‘pupil of Reason’ according to his friend Elihu Hubbard 
Smith and a devotee of Godwin’s creed of ‘rational anarchy’, if 
there ever was one, should be so attracted to issues and phenome-
na that seem to go beyond the rational and the known. 
(Verhoeven 95) 
Given the elusive nature of Wieland's mysteries and Brown's interest in both the 
cosmically and the materially determined Gothic topics, it would seem that the Goth-
ic functions for Brown as something closer to what Tzvetan Todorov has called “the 
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fantastic,” that narrative form which “occupies the duration of … uncertainty” with 
regard to either a natural or supernatural account of their events (25). That is, for 
Brown, the Gothic didn't serve as a space to float theories of the cosmic world, nor 
did it serve to conjure specters for the sole purpose of proving them to be parlor 
tricks; instead, the Gothic became a site of conscious and prolonged uncertainty, an 
exercise in resisting determinations.  
Brown's engagement with systems of faith is also fraught in the period surround-
ing his prolific output of fiction and perhaps landed him among a slightly different 
kind of duration of uncertainty. The early 1790s saw Brown at his most engaged 
with Godwinian rationalism and antistatism but the late 1790s of Wieland's writing 
falls between this “free-thinking” period and Brown's religious turn, expressed in 
magazine editorial writings in 1803, calling himself a “champion of the Christian 
religion” (Cody, 26). Rather than pinpoint a dramatic moment of conversion, or a 
shift in self-promotion, it seems more likely to imagine Brown, like so many before 
and after him, to be actively grappling with questions of faith and doubt over the 
course of this period. Granting that, his choice of Gothic mode in Wieland, neither 
definitively supernatural nor exhaustively explained, seems to coincide with a faith 
in the numinous that was itself neither fully denied nor accepted. It is this sense of 
Brown's uncertain Gothic and a corresponding sense of openness to, but not concret-
ing of, faith that I propose to be operant in Wieland.  
Unlike the deeply entrenched and more clearly defined Enlightenment causality 
of Clara, the characterization of this alternative posture of uncertainty persists in the 
novel, evoked not by the flowing sequence of events which Clara details, but by the 
uncertain gothicism which undermines them. Carwin's character, considerations of 
differing religions, and a depiction of faith in elusive but immanent meaning, all 
contribute to this alternative ideological posture. Helpfully, much critical attention to 
Wieland has turned on Brown's ambiguous relationship with religion and the novel's 
seemingly contradictory depictions of skepticism and belief. While critics such as 
Marshall Surratt describe a religiously committed Brown, taking at face value the 
author's description of himself as a “champion of the Christian religion” (311), it 
seems nearly impossible to square this with the novel's violent depiction of fanati-
cism and religious dogma. Michael Gilmore, with perhaps more nuance, suggests 
that Brown had a very mixed, sometimes antagonistic view of religion (108) but 
nonetheless regards Wieland as a “retelling of the fable of the fall of man” (107). 
Gilmore pursues this interpretation as a means to investigate Calvinistic and Catholic 
impulses among the characters and suggests that Carwin's Catholicism and “curiosi-
ty” bring an end to the edenic society of the enlightened foursome. This framework 
is helpful to my interpretation, but for different reasons than those Gilmore de-
scribes. In considering the novel's concern with “knowledge”, specifically the 
“knowledge of good and evil” whose pursuit precipitates the fall, my reading would 
reverse Gilmore's such that it is not Carwin's Catholicism and literary curiosity 
which are figured as the danger but, in fact, the surety of knowledge in Wieland's 
group which causes their destruction.  
This framing of “the fall” as precipitated by the allures of surety is figured dra-
matically in Clara's sleepwalking dream near the cliff on her property. “I thought I 
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saw my brother,” Clara recalls of her dream, “standing at some distance before me, 
beckoning and calling me to make haste. He stood on the opposite edge of the gulf. I 
mended my pace and one step more would have plunged me into this abyss” (57-
58). Here, literally, Clara is being tempted towards a fall by the vision of her brother 
whose encouragement is to “make haste”. This impulse for direction, and impatience 
for reaching the goal, is reminiscent of what has already been observed in Wieland's 
quest for religious certainty. It is Carwin, hidden at the spot where Clara stands at the 
edge of the precipice, who calls to her “Hold! hold!” and saves her from the fall. 
This remonstration anticipates Carwin's intervention in the climax, where Wieland 
attacks Clara with just such religious zeal, when Carwin's voice “burst from the ceil-
ing, and commanded him—to hold!” (211). In both cases, Carwin's direction to 
“hold” stands in opposition to a desire to progress, which is consequently linked with 
the brother and his desire for certainty. Elsewhere, impediments to forward progress 
are connected to Carwin as Clara demands of him surety, a flow of clear answers as 
to his accountability: “Thou falterest” she accuses, “faltering is ominous; say yes or 
no: one word will suffice” (200). It makes sense, given the picture of Clara's dedica-
tion to linearity, progression, and certain answers illustrated above, that Carwin is 
alternatively linked to a faltering uncertainty which resists and disconcerts the group. 
The scene of Carwin saving Clara at the edge of the cliff is significantly laden with 
images of ambiguity, not the least of which are brought about by Carwin's voice 
being thrown impossibly. Unable to “distinguish between sleep and wakefulness” 
Clara “cannot estimate the time, [...her] faculties were still too confused and the 
darkness too intense”(58). As with most of Carwin's scenes, here it is the dimness, 
ambiguity, “the state of uncertainty” (59) which is most notable.  
Carwin's associations with this hesitating uncertainty and his central role in the 
mysterious or ambiguous moments of plot make him the character most associated 
with the fantastic. And indeed, Carwin's contributions to the plot seem almost always 
to prolong our doubts with regard to causes rather than to illuminate. This unac-
countable uncertainty contrasts with Clara's attempts at rigid plotting in the novel, 
and likewise connects to different ideologies of surety. This is visible in the differen-
tiation of Clara's companions as mostly rationalist and Calvinistic, wherein one's 
election is always already certain, compared with Carwin who is markedly Catholic, 
which carried strong associations with excesses and passions in Gothic literature, 
and his associated with art and literature. Gilmore goes so far as to describe an “op-
pressive theological temper of Brown's tale” whose “explicitly Calvinistic bias [...] 
stamps Carwin as one of the damned” (108) because of his Catholicism. But Car-
win's Catholicism, which might be seen as idolatrous and excessively ornate to 
Protestants, overlaps with the description of him as an enjoyer of literature, a de-
scription seeming to set him out as distinct among the group. Despite Catholicism's 
marginalization, criticism shows the persistent “sensory or mystical appeal of the 
Catholic church” (Elbert 115) in Gothic literature even among Protestants into the 
nineteenth Century. The difference between the literary Catholic and the more rhe-
torically interested Calvinists is figured in their approach to what is now termed the 
humanities. Elder Wieland filled his hours with duties which “were laborious and 
mechanical […] they withheld him from paths more flowery” (7). Most importantly 
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he “entertained no relish for books, and was wholly unconscious of any power they 
possessed to delight or instruct” until he stumbled upon devotional and religious 
texts which he accepted as fact and constructed beliefs “formed on a narrow scale” 
(7-8). His temple was built “without seat, table, or ornament of any kind” (11) and 
though the younger Wieland will take up pleasures in that same temple, in “his stud-
ies, he pursued an austerer and more arduous path. He was much conversant with the 
history of religious opinions and took pains to ascertain their validity” (21).  
This austere and rigid search for religious validity, figured by the solitary temple 
and reflected in the Calvinistic tenets of the group contrast to the description of Car-
win who “devoted himself to the literature and religion” (62-63) of his adopted 
Spain. While selfish and even occasionally cruel, Carwin's actions are tied to a “pas-
sion for mystery” (184) which seems to extend or coincide with his religious alle-
giances. Clara describes her groups' view of Catholicism with regards to education 
saying it “was not easy to reconcile his conversion to the Romish faith with those 
proofs of [his] knowledge” (63). Gilmore suggests that Carwin's Catholicism, in 
contrast to the Calvinism of the text, is linked to gothicism itself (109). Consequent-
ly, whereas most of the characters' religiousness is tied to fact, nonfiction, and rheto-
ric, the text's alternative sees a faith animated by uncertainty and flourishing in a 
literary sense, even a Gothic one. Carwin's actions as the savior of Clara, as well as 
the reader's disquiet at Clara's marriage to Pleyel, who had just before refused to 
credit her testimony with anything resembling charity or faith, seem to undermine 
Clara's explicated goals of plotting out the story to serve her moral vision. Carwin's 
connections to literature, and the Gothic qualities his mysterious persona bring to 
Clara's narrative both help to provide a contrasting sensibility to the text, a sensibility 
which might be described with less tenets and certain dogmas, and more faith in the 
face of uncertainty. 
In addition to his rootless wandering and his suspect religion, Carwin presents 
something of a paradoxical picture to the group, marrying “the rustic” and “the ad-
vantages of education” (47). Clara ponders over this strange combination, and with-
out irony, attempts to capture “the radiance inexpressibly serene […] which it would 
be vain to describe” in “a sketch upon paper” (49). This sequence is telling due to the 
dramatic discrepancy between Carwin's mysteriousness, his associations with art and 
literature, and Clara's desire to capture and codify that very expression. These asso-
ciations with fictionality serve as open possibilities in Wieland which express re-
sistance to Enlightenment surety, rhetoric, and Clara's flowing, linear plotting. Fic-
tionality is so important in the text because the characters who resist it's openness 
perpetuate the problematic concreting of possibility into closed and reduced systems 
or, as Thomas Koenigs suggests, they dissolve possibility into probability. Koenigs 
reads Wieland as an investigation of pedagogical methods, illustrating the foursome's 
view that effective “pedagogy depends on the actuality of the model as opposed to a 
“phantom” of fiction” (726). Thus for Koenigs, “Pleyel's probabilistic thought fails 
for the same reason as Theodore’s belief in supernatural intervention: it fails to re-
spect a degree of uncertainty […. both are] shown to be susceptible to epistemologi-
cal error due to a failure to think possibilistically” (731). I agree with Koenigs's here 
and with his further claim that Brown forwards “skepticism of our ability to know 
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anything with certainty” yet still maintains that “epistemological uncertainty should 
not hinder us from attempting to discover truth, or paralyze us with inaction, but it 
should be kept constantly in view to inform our actions, so that we aspire to get as 
close to certainty as possible” (728). But rather than seeing this as purely a question 
of pedagogy, it is also seems a question of faith, of a faith comprised in part by doubt 
but animated by aspirations for truth, pursuant of meaningfulness but resistant to 
mastery over meaning. Carwin's function in the plot, his Catholicism, his associa-
tions with the Gothic, all orient him away from the reductive praxis of Enlighten-
ment causality but not away from the pursuit of understanding. It is in this manner, 
that the text's concerns with faith operates like Todorov's fantastic, suspending the 
reader between accountings, conditioning an acceptance of the limitations of know-
ability, but still inviting investment in the process of discernment.  
This idea of being driven by a desire for broader truths with the understanding 
that concrete understanding is impossible is one of the ways in which faith has been 
defined—attending to a hope for transcendent meaning without ever seeing it solidi-
fied. Jacques Derrida has written sensitively of faith at the limits of knowledge, in 
openness and “indecisive oscillation … between revelation and revealability … be-
tween possibility or virtuality of the event” (68). Likewise, and crucial to the con-
cerns of faith in Wieland, this uncertainty is linked to the openness to difference and 
otherness. Derrida asks if “[r]espect for this singular indecision or for this hyperbolic 
outbidding between two originarities, the order of the 'revealed' and the order of the 
'revealable,' is this not at once the chance of every responsible decision and of anoth-
er 'reflecting faith,' of a new 'tolerance'?” (68). This uncertain faith is made necessary 
by the gap between the hoped for, desired truth and the capacity of human 
knowledge to ascertain or of language to describe. Carwin's person is significantly 
described as “incomprehensible […] such as no human mind can unravel” (120-
121). And though his actions are often incorrect and sometimes cruel, the disruption 
his difference brings to the text is essential, as is the alternative questions his charac-
ter figures with regard to the search for understanding. Robert Hughes locates this 
concern, suggesting that Wieland pursues a question of ethics and meaning in the 
language at the limits of signification (65), a methodology akin to Derrida's. And 
Hughes insists it is Carwin who comes closest to speaking “truth only […] through 
false impersonation” hinting at “the specific ways that literature can speak truth to us 
in ways distinct from the truths of scientific, philosophical, or (one might suppose) 
divine intercourse” (Hughes 73). My reading of Carwin's Gothic associations, which 
press the limits of signification, would go further to suggest that these ethical, moral, 
and epistemological borders, these “limits,” which the story plumbs, require a sense 
of faith and faithfulness as necessary components to bridging the gap acknowledged 
to exist between an aspired to meaning and a limited expression. Brown's overt 
claims of the story's didactic purpose coupled with the pronounced short-comings of 
Clara's methodical attempts at concreting just such an explication, illustrate precisely 
this need.  
The slippage between traditional terms of faith and faith as an ethics of openness 
emerges in terms precisely associated with certainty in the text. When discussing the 
possibility of divine direction, it is Carwin who cautiously suggests that a supernatu-
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ral access to divine truth is not impossible; while Clara admits that theories of divine 
communication were “heard by [her] with contempt” (68). Likewise, Pleyel “scru-
pled not to deny faith to any testimony but that of his senses” (69) as far as his opin-
ions on the voices went and didn't allow alternative facts “to mould his belief, but 
merely to give birth to doubts” (69). Significantly, and in Clara's own words, Pleyel 
is “precipitate and prone to condemn” those who believe differently (109). The alter-
native faith implied in the text's Gothic uncertainty doesn't just help to imagine that 
ineffable truths exist though they may not be described, it also anticipates an ethics 
of acceptance which would accommodate others and otherness in ways which the 
surety of the novel's central characters fail. This is echoed in Derrida's exploration of 
faith at the limits of knowledge, which grounds “a new 'tolerance'”(59) and also in 
thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, whose work “propose[s] to describe … a relation-
ship with the other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not a to-
talization of history but the idea of infinity” (52). This infinity counterposes the im-
pulse to totalization and mastery and instead sees the other as “beyond the capacity 
of the I” (51). Brown's Gothic uncertainties obviously prefigure those of Derrida and 
Levinas but nonetheless caution against the same surety born of singular perspec-
tives and of totalizing systems. 
To finish on this note, I will return to Clara's methods and this surety which mani-
fests itself most problematically as a sort of closedness, against which the open, 
faithful, uncertainty contrasts. The stakes of this closedness are not just seen in un-
generous condemnations and contempt but also in hopelessness and resignation. 
Clara declares early that the “sentiment which dictates [her] feelings is not hope” (5) 
and intimates that all events must ultimately culminate in death, the final closure. 
Clara's sense of events flowing determinately from their source toward their inevita-
ble conclusion, and the hopeless sense of meaning as a closure which only death can 
complete, again coincides with Brooks's narratological work. Brooks argues that a 
text is driven by this ultimate telos towards its finale and “[o]nly the end can finally 
determine the meaning, close the sentence as a signifying totality” (22), which is 
why narratives must “imagine in advance the act of transmission, the moment of 
reading and understanding that it cannot itself ever know, since the act always comes 
after the writing, in a posthumous moment” (34). In Clara's view of closed possibili-
ties and fatalistic meaning it is unsurprising that she sees death this way, as the only 
ending.  
The sense of a singular religious destiny, the concreting of meaning in rhetoric, 
and the final closure of death are all tied together in the climactic ending scene. Clara 
writes of the climax that this “is the spot which I have chosen in which to breathe my 
last sigh,” asking just before “[h]ave I not fulfilled my destiny?” She follows through 
on her original metaphor of flowing eventualities stating, “I care not from what 
source these disasters have flowed; it suffices that they have swallowed up our hopes 
and our existence” (213). The duty of writing and the sense of unavoidable death 
occupy the last lines of the narrative before the final retrospective chapter: “and now 
my repose is coming—my work is done” (214). Here, the text most explicitly con-
trasts a living uncertain faith with a stifling and deadly certainty, suggesting of the 
later that such views are not just oppressive, as with Wieland's crime, but also hope-
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less. As Wood writes of the eighteenth century impulse to causally attribute all trage-
dy to intention, the “conspiratorial interpretations of the age were a generalized ap-
plication to the world of politics of the pervasive duplicity assumed to exist in all 
human affairs” (427). Alternatively, Brown's ambiguous Gothic cautions this mas-
tery of knowledge, even as it anticipates a generous and hopeful ethics which might 
exist in uncertainty.  
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